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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT        COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
In the Matter of the Application of
SHERMAN WALKER,#92-A-7141,
                           Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #44-1-2012-0315.12
INDEX #138638
           -against-                                             ORI # NY044015J              
NYS BOARD OF PAROLE,
      Respondent.      
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Sherman Walker, verified on April 23, 2012 and filed in the
St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on April 27, 2012.   Petitioner, who is now an inmate
at the Orleans Correctional Facility, is challenging the September 2011 determination
denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 18 months.   The Court1
issued an Order to Show Cause on May 3, 2012 and has received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer/Return including Confidential Exhibit B, C and D, verified on
June 28, 2012, as well as petitioner’s Reply thereto, dated July 12, 2012 and filed in the
St. Lawrence County Clerk’s office on July 16, 2012.  In response to the Court’s Letter
Order of September 17, 2012 the Court has also received and reviewed respondent’s
Supplemental Exhibits (O, P (confidential) and Q), filed in the St. Lawrence County
 The copy of the parole denial decision set forth at the end of the transcript of petitioner’s1
September 12, 2011 Parole Board appearances (Respondent’s Exhibit F) begins by stating “Denied, 24
months, to 2/2013.  “The copy of the parole denial decision set forth in the Parole Board Release Decision
Notice (Respondent’s Exhibit G), however, begins by stating “DENIED - HOLD FOR 18 MONTHS, NEXT
APPEARANCE DATE: 02/2013".  Notwithstanding the conflicting entries (24-month hold versus 18-month
hold), respondent acknowledges in its papers that petitioner is subject to an 18-month hold.
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Clerk’s office on October 9, 2012, as well as petitioner’s Supplemental Reply, dated
October 31, 2012 and received directly in chambers on November 5, 2012.
On February 13, 1992 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, as a second violent felony offender, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of
12½ to 25 years upon his convictions of the crimes of Robbery 1° and Robbery 2°.  On
February 27, 1992 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Queens County, as a
second felony offender, to a consecutive indeterminate sentence of 7 to 14 years upon his
conviction of the crime of Robbery 2°.  On June 16, 1992 petitioner was sentenced in
Supreme Court, Queens County, as a second violent felony offender, to an indeterminate
sentence of 7 to 14 years upon his conviction of the crime of Robbery 1°.  This sentence
was directed to run concurrently with respect to the sentence imposed in Queens County
on February 27, 1992.  DOCCS officials have determined that the multiple sentences
imposed against petitioner produced an aggregate indeterminate sentence of 19½ to 39
years.  
Petitioner made his second appearance before a Parole Board on September 12,
2011.  Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying petitioner discretionary
release and directing that he be held for an additional 18 months.  The denial
determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS DENIED.  AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD,
YOUR PERSONAL INTERVIEW, AND DUE DELIBERATION, IT IS THE
DETERMINATION OF THIS PANEL THAT, IF RELEASED AT THIS
TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD
NOT LIVE AT LIBERTY W/O VIOLATING THE LAW, YOUR RELEASE AT
THIS TIME IS INCOMPATIBLE W/ THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF
THE COMMUNITY, AND IF SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF
THIS CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.  THIS
DECISION IS BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:  YOU
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APPEARE [SIC] BEFORE THIS PANEL WITH THE SERIOUS I.O.’S OF
ROBBERY 1  (2 CTS) AND ROBBERY 2  (2 CTS) WHEREIN YOU IN-ST ND
CONCERT COMMITTED THREE SEPARATE ROBBERIES OF JEWELRY. 
ONE ROBBERY INVOLVED A GUN AND ONE ROBBERY INVOLVED A
KNIFE.  THESE CRIMES CULMINATE A LONG CRIMINAL HISTORY
FILLED W/ ROBBERY, ILLEGAL DRUGS AND GRAND LARCENY.  YOU
HAVE VIOLATED PAROLE IN THE PAST.  YOU HAVE A WELL
ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.  IN ADDITION,
YOU HAVE A POOR RECORD OF ADJUSTMENT WHILE IN PRISON
WHICH INCLUDES MULTIPLE TIER II INFRACTIONS AND TIER III
INFRACTION.  CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO ANY PROGRAM
COMPLETION, HOWEVER, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS DENIED.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on December 12, 2011. 
Although the Appeals Unit failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the 4-
month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a belated decision on administrative
appeal was, in fact, issued on or about May 31, 2012, after the commencement of this
proceeding.   
At the time of petitioner’s September 12, 2011 Parole Board appearance and the
issuance of the parole denial determination Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended
by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A, §§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provided,
in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a
3 of 9
[* 3]
participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
At the time of petitioner’s September 12, 2011 Parole Board appearance and the
issuance of the parole denial determination Executive Law  §259-c(4) provided, in
relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall “ . . .establish written guidelines for its use in
making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written guidelines may consider the
use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state board of
parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”  Executive
Law §259-c(4), however, was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective September 30, 2011 .  Thus, the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4)2
was not yet in effect at the time of petitioner’s September 12, 2011 Parole Board
appearance and the issuance of the parole denial determination.  The amended version
of Executive Law §259-c(4) provides that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“ . . .establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. 
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates maybe released to parole supervision . . .”  (Emphasis added).
 L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, section 49(f) provides that “. . . the amendments to subdivision2
4 of section 259-c of the executive law made by section thirty-eight-b of this act shall take effect six months
after it shall have become a law . . .”  Since the underlying legislation was enacted on March 31, 2011, the
amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4) became effective as of September 30, 2011 (or October 1, 2011).
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051.  Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner first contends that the parole denial determination was based upon
erroneous information.  More specifically, he asserts that he had no robbery conviction(s)
prior to his 1992 convictions and that he had no prior parole violation.  Petitioner’s
assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clear to this Court that on October 27,
1986 he was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County, to an indeterminate sentence of
2 to 6 years upon his conviction of the crime of Robbery 1°.  Although the Kings County
Sentence and Commitment Order (respondent’s Exhibit O) shows the name of the
defendant therein as Sherman McRae, such order identifies the defendant’s birthday as
January 24, 1967 and his NYSID Number as 5026622Q - the same birth date and NYSID
number set forth on Sherman Walker’s 1992 New York County Sentence and
Commitment Order as well as all of Sherman Walker’s 1992 Queens County Sentence and
Commitment Orders.  Petitioner’s use of the name Sherman McRae, moreover, is
consistent with information set forth in respondent’s Confidential Exhibit P.  That exhibit
also reflects a prior Youthful Offender (Robbery 1°) adjudication in Kings County.  
It is also clear that in November of 1988 petitioner’s parole was revoked following
a contested parole revocation hearing.  Although the Parole Revocation Decision
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Notice/Parole Board Decision Notice (respondent’s Exhibit M) identified the parole
violator as Steven Melvin or Stevin Melvin, such notices identified the parole violator by
the same 5026622Q NYSID Number affixed to petitioner’s various sentence and
commitment orders.  Petitioner’s use of the name “Steven Melvin” and/or “Steve Melvin,”
moreover, is consistent with information set forth in respondent’s Confidential Exhibit
P.  In addition, petitioner’s use of the alias “Steven Melvin” is conceded by the petitioner.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds no basis to conclude that the September 2011
parole denial determination was based upon erroneous information.  
Petitioner next argues that in rendering its parole denial determination the Parole
Board failed to take into consideration all of the requisite statutory factors.  In this regard
petitioner specifically cites his participation in a DOCCS temporary release program
(outside work crew) as well as his parole “plan.”  A Parole Board, however, need not assign
equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a
discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those
factors in its written decision.  See Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d
1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v. Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6
NY3d 713.  As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court
reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the
proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory
guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the
facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given
that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or
grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York
State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
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In the case at bar,  reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the
September 12, 2011 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it
information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors including petitioner’s
therapeutic/vocational programming, academic record, participation in an outside
clearance program , family support/release plans , and problematic disciplinary record,3
in addition to the circumstances of the multiple violent crimes underlying his
incarceration, criminal record and prior parole violation.  See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d
828.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the
Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him
from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, before closing the
record of the parole interview a parole commissioner questioned the petitioner as follows: 
“What else do you think we should know?  Did I miss anything or is there anything you
would like to point out that we did not go over?” In response to those open-ended
invitations petitioner responded “[n]ot right off hand. Not right off hand.  Everything is
pretty much covered.”  In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the
Parole Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See McAllister v. New York
State Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73
AD3d 1354.   
Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
 Petitioner’s outside clearance was noted in the Inmate Status Report and during the course of the3
September 12, 2011 parole interview.  When  asked by a parole commissioner about his outside clearance
activities  petitioner responded that he had over 400 hours of outside clearance and then stated as follows:
“That was in the last facility I was in.  I was working for Woodbury from the outside to Sullivan Correctional
Facility, working doing the grass, janitor work, cleaning up things they needed me to do, buffing and stuff
in that regard and painting and stuff like that.”  
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bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior criminal record and
parole violation.  See Veras v. New York State Division of Parole, 56 AD3d 878, Serrano
v. Dennison, 46 AD3d 1002, Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45 AD3d
1086 and Farid v. Travis, 17 AD3d 754, app dis 5 NY3d 782.
Citing Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc 3d 694, petitioner
next argues that the Parole Board erred in failing to apply the amended version of
Executive Law §259-c(4) when it considered him for discretionary parole release and,
ultimately, denied such release.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 2011 amendment to
Executive Law §259-c(4) was designated by the legislature as taking effect on
September 30, 2011, the Thwaites court found that the amendment had to be applied
retroactively to Mr. Thwaites’ March 16, 2010 parole denial determination.  This Court,
however respectfully disagrees with the conclusion of the Thwaites court and, for the
reasons set forth in the March 6, 2012 Decision and Judgment of the Supreme Court,
Albany County (Hon. Richard M. Platkin) in Hamilton v. New York State Division of
Parole, 36 Misc 3d 440, finds no basis to apply the amended version of Executive Law
§259-c(4) in reviewing a pre-September 30, 2011 parole denial determination.  See Tafari
v. Evans, 36 Misc 3d 1216(A), 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 51355(U).  As stated by the Hamilton
court, “[i]t is apparent . . . that the State Legislature considered the question of the
effectiveness of the 2011 Amendments and determined that the new procedures
contemplated by the amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4) should not be given effect
with respect to administrative proceedings conducted prior to October 1, 2011.”  36 Misc
3d 440 at 443.
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Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
   
Dated: February 4, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York ___________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Justice, Supreme Court
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